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Abstract
One of the most influential findings of the voting behavior literature of the 
past two decades was the realization that the clarity of the domestic insti-
tutional context influences the relationship between economic perceptions 
and incumbent vote. This article extends this “clarity of responsibility” argu-
ment beyond economics to another policy field—European integration. To 
what extent do national political institutions mediate the extent to which 
voters reward or punish government for their policies relating to the 
European Union (EU) or European integration, that is, EU issue voting? 
Using data from the 2004 European Election Study, the authors provide 
evidence that clarity of responsibility affects the strength of EU issue voting. 
Specifically, EU issue voting is accentuated when the domestic institutional 
environment provides clear lines of responsibility. This finding suggests that 
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the “Europeanization” of national electoral politics depends in part on the 
domestic institutional context within each member state.
Keywords
clarity of responsibility, elections, European integration, voting behavior, 
multilevel modeling
Much of the literature on voting behavior over the past two decades has cen-
tered on the interactive relationship between domestic institutional contexts 
and vote choice. In particular, scholars interested in the link between the econ-
omy and incumbent vote have demonstrated that economic judgments are more 
likely to have a bearing on how (and even whether) to vote when responsibility 
for government performance is clear (Anderson, 1995, 2000; Bengtsson, 2004; 
Lewis-Beck, 1988; Nadeau, Niemi, & Yoshinaka, 2002; Powell & Whitten, 
1993; Samuels, 2004; Tillman, 2008; Whitten & Palmer, 1999). The basic 
argument is that institutional ambiguity camouflages responsibility for 
policy-making decisions and outcomes, hampering citizens’ ability to express 
their discontent by voting politicians out of office.
Clearly the economy is not the only policy area for which voters assign 
responsibility. Indeed, it stands to reason that the so-called “clarity of respon-
sibility” hypothesis advanced by economic voting scholars should be broadly 
applicable. We apply these arguments to an alternative policy field, focusing 
in particular on how domestic political institutions influence to what extent 
voters reward or punish government for their policies relating to the European 
Union (EU) or European integration. Specifically, we ask whether the sim-
plicity of the lines of accountability in a given political context moderates 
the extent to which vote choices are affected by citizens’ evaluations by the 
European integration policies pursued by their governments, a process termed 
EU issue voting (de Vries, 2007).
Policy making regarding the EU or European integration provides a use-
ful backdrop for studying this relationship between clarity of responsibil-
ity and voting behavior. Similar to the economy, European integration is today 
an inescapable issue for governments of all political stripes. The extension 
of EU competencies from market integration into noneconomic issues 
means that European integration in the post-Maastricht era can no longer be 
treated as simply a foreign policy issue. Quite the contrary, national gov-
ernments actively shape the process of widening and deepening European 
integration through their activities in the Council of the European Union 
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and, as we assert below, are increasingly judged by citizens on their capa-
bilities and decision making in this area (see de Vries, 2007, 2009; Evans, 
1998; Gabel, 2000; Tillman, 2004). Moreover, European integration can 
have wide-ranging consequences for voters across economic, social, and 
cultural policy—making it important to voters and of interest to students of 
voting behavior.
In choosing to concentrate on European integration policy, we also benefit 
from rich cross-national data. The 2004 European Election Study (EES) admin-
istered comparable surveys in member states across the EU, so we are able to 
analyze EU issue voting in 19 Western and Eastern European countries. 
Importantly, the countries included in the survey also exhibit considerable 
variation in their institutional settings, which is key since we are interested in 
how the clarity of political environments influences voting behavior. Finally, 
and unlike most previous studies of clarity of responsibility, these data allow 
us to include respondents in a number of postcommunist member states (for 
an exception, see Roberts, 2008, 2009). This moves the analysis of clarity of 
responsibility beyond the advanced democracies, increasing our confidence 
in the applicability of this concept.
The results of our analysis lend credence to the clarity of responsibility 
argument, indicating that institutional clarity affects the strength of EU issue 
voting. This finding echoes those found in previous studies on the relationship 
between the economy and the vote. In environments where the lines of respon-
sibility are clear, voters are better able to decipher which actors to reward or 
punish for European integration policies when they step into the ballot box. 
By contrast, in settings where the domestic institutional context blunts clarity, 
individuals are less likely to factor judgments regarding European integration 
policies into their vote choice since they are unable to apportion responsibility 
and consequently not sure whom to hold accountable.
The implications of our findings are important for voting scholars as well 
as those interested in EU studies. Since Powell and Whitten’s influential 
work on clarity of responsibility in 1993, students of voting behavior have 
continuously sought to confirm and expand their initial theory and results 
(Anderson, 1995, 2000; Bengtsson, 2004; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Nadeau et al., 
2002; Samuels, 2004). By and large, however, this research has remained in 
the field of economic voting (Giger, in press, and Tavits, 2007, being the 
exceptions). The results presented here demonstrate the portability of the 
clarity of responsibility hypothesis beyond the realm of economic policies.
This article also contributes to the literature on European integration. In 
focusing on EU issue voting, it speaks directly to the debate on the implica-
tions of EU policy making and the actions of national government actors at 
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this level of government for domestic politics and particularly to questions 
regarding the Europeanization of party and electoral politics (e.g., Börzel & 
Risse, 2003, 2007). Moreover, our article is relevant to the ongoing academic 
discussion on the democratic deficit in the EU (e.g., Coultrap, 1999; Føllesdal 
& Hix, 2006; Katz, 2000; Moravcsik, 2002; Zweifel, 2002). Do national elec-
tions provide an effective indirect mechanism helping “to ensure that EU policy-
making [and the actions of national government officials] is, in nearly all 
cases,” as Moravcsik (2002) claims, “clean, transparent, effective and politi-
cally responsive to the demands of European citizens” (p. 605)? The evidence 
presented in this study yields only a qualified yes to this question. Though we 
find support for EU issue voting, suggesting that European citizens are able to 
use national elections to express their satisfaction or concerns regarding their 
government’s European integration policies, we also find that this “electoral 
connection” (Carrubba, 2001) is conditioned by the national institutional con-
text. Indeed, we illustrate that although voters’ ability to express approval or 
dissatisfaction with European integration policies pursued by their govern-
ments can be effective when the lines of responsibility are clear, an opaque 
institutional setting that is characterized by competing political actors and 
multiple loci of control obscures responsibility, with potentially detrimental 
effects for democratic accountability.
The article proceeds as follows. We begin with the clarity of responsibility 
hypothesis and apply this argument to EU issue voting. The following sec-
tions describe the data, analysis, results, and robustness checks. Finally, we 
conclude with a summary of our findings and a discussion of the implications 
of this study for future research.
Clarity of Responsibility and EU Issue Voting
There is an expansive body of literature on the extent to which differing 
political–institutional contexts influence citizens’ voting behavior. In par-
ticular, political scientists working in the field of economic voting have 
sought to explain cross-national differences in the relationship between the 
economy and government support by arguing that clarity of responsibil-
ity conditions this relationship (Anderson, 1995, 2000; Bengtsson, 2004; 
Lewis-Beck, 1988; Nadeau et al., 2002; Powell & Whitten, 1993; Samuels, 
2004; Tillman, 2008; Whitten & Palmer, 1999). The basic contention is that 
domestic political systems that diffuse power among multiple actors (parties 
in particular) obscure the lines of responsibility, making it difficult for voters 
to evaluate and sanction the government in power for economic or policy 
decisions. The clearest application of this argument is in the area of economic 
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voting, where the vast majority of research has focused. Applied to the study 
of economic voting, the clarity of responsibility hypothesis suggests that the 
effect of national economic conditions on the vote is weaker in low-clarity 
systems. This hypothesis has found support in most studies (Anderson, 1995, 
2000; Bengtsson, 2004; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Nadeau et al., 2002; Powell & 
Whitten, 1993; Samuels, 2004; Whitten & Palmer, 1999; but see Royed, 
Leyden, & Borrelli, 2000). Other recent studies have expanded on these find-
ings to demonstrate that clarity of responsibility affects voter participation 
(Taylor, 2000; Tillman, 2008) and that vertical clarity of responsibility (under-
stood in terms of a federal-unitary dimension) also moderates economic 
voting (Anderson, 2006).
Moving beyond these studies, there is good reason to believe that the clar-
ity of responsibility argument has further applications beyond economic vot-
ing. The notion of clarity of responsibility applies to government accountability 
and the degree to which institutions work to diminish or enhance actors’ influ-
ence over policy making, broadly defined. In a recent article, Tavits (2007) 
demonstrates that institutional clarity affects the prevalence of corruption 
across different societies, with low-clarity settings facilitating higher levels 
of corruption. In this article, we expand the clarity of responsibility argument 
to consider its effect on voting on a noneconomic issue, European integra-
tion policy. We are interested in the extent to which citizens use their vote in 
national elections to hold their governments accountable for their actions 
taken regarding the EU and, more importantly, how this relationship is affected 
by the clarity of the formal institutional setting.
The basic clarity of responsibility argument as applied to EU issue voting 
is that citizens’ ability to assign responsibility for a nation’s policies regarding 
European integration and to express approval or disapproval by voting them 
out of office is filtered by the domestic political environment (Anderson, 2000, 
p. 153). The assumption is that vote choice is at least in part a product of citi-
zens’ evaluation of a government’s European integration policies. Voters pre-
fer governments that pursue European integration policies that align with their 
own preferences and are apt to punish governments with opposing actions by 
voting incumbent parties out of office. But accountability for policy making is 
seldom transparent. As Anderson (2000) notes, “Responsibility frequently is 
shared by competing political actors through mechanisms such as coalition 
government or simply obscured because of multiple levels of decision-making 
and political control” (p. 153; also see Anderson, 1995). Citizens are able to 
assign credit or blame for a government’s European integration policies only 
to the extent that they are able to discern who is in fact responsible (Anderson, 
2000; Powell, 2000).
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We argue that voters in high-clarity systems are more likely to punish gov-
ernments for European integration policy that they view is not in the interests 
of citizens or of the country that the government officials represent. Implicit in 
our argument is the notion that national government officials are the dominant 
force in crafting and influencing EU policy making. Although EU legislative 
authority operates on both supranational and intergovernmental platforms 
through the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union and 
many decisions are made under codecision requiring consent of both institu-
tions, the Council of the European Union is the principal decision-making 
institution of the EU. The council is made up of national government ministers 
from each member state and initiates new EU legislation in main areas of EU 
policy making ranging from foreign policy and economic and fiscal policy 
to competition and energy policy. Thus, the council often initiates laws that 
will replace existing national law. With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty at 
the end of 2009, most council decisions are made by qualified majority vot-
ing, with some key decisions such as accession to the EU still requiring a 
unanimous vote (Cini, 2007; Jørgensen, Pollack, & Rosamond, 2006). In 
addition, we also assume that voters’ support or opposition for an incumbent 
government party is at least partially a product of citizens’ evaluation of a 
government’s European integration policies and that the EU issue is important 
to at least some voters. A growing body of work that explores the impact of 
European attitudes on voters’ choices in national elections provides evidence 
that it does play an important role in some countries at certain elections (see, 
e.g., de Vries, 2007, 2009; Evans, 1998, 2002; Schoen, 2008; Tillman, 2004). 
For example, in his examination of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, Tillman 
(2004) finds evidence of EU issue voting at the time of accession, a period 
in which EU membership can be assumed to have been salient. Similarly, de 
Vries (2007) finds evidence of EU issue voting in Denmark and the United 
Kingdom, two countries characterized by high levels of issue salience and 
party conflict over Europe, yet fails to find such evidence in the Netherlands, 
where conflict and salience regarding European integration are much more 
limited.
Our expectation is that voters are more likely to reward or punish govern-
ments for their European integration policy in higher clarity systems where a 
single, unified party has primary control over policy making. In lower clarity 
settings in which power is dispersed among multiple parties or in which policy-
making coalitions are continuously shifting, by contrast, voters will be less 
able to award or punish governments for their European integration policies 
(Powell, 2000, p. 11). The rationale for this is twofold. First, institutional 
structures that encourage power-sharing arrangements among multiple actors 
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blur partisan accountability for EU policies. Since there are numerous par-
ticipants involved in formulating policy, it is difficult for citizens to apportion 
responsibility and, in turn, to hold a single party accountable for the govern-
ment’s policies. Consequently, the likelihood that individuals will base their 
voting decision on EU policy making is less in low-clarity environments. Second, 
it is often unclear in low-clarity systems whether a citizen’s vote will actually 
induce a change in a government’s European integration policy. Elections in 
multiparty systems can be far from decisive; instead of producing a clear 
winner, they tend to serve as the basis for coalition bargaining among a num-
ber of parties (Powell, 2000). Voters’ ability to punish or reward government 
officials for their European integration policies is therefore incomplete, 
as it may be unclear which parties will participate in any newly elected gov-
ernment. Thus, as Tillman (2008) notes in discussing economic voting, indi-
viduals’ capacity to factor an issue into their voting behavior is affected in 
two ways when there is a lack of clarity of responsibility: “Citizens may be 
unable to predict the ultimate outcome of the election (in the sense of know-
ing which parties will govern), and they may be unable to hold all policy 
makers accountable in an election” (p. 1295). Here we apply this logic to EU 
policy making.
A number of different institutional arrangements disperse power through-
out a political system and thereby cloud responsibility. In this study, we 
focus on a subset of indicators identified by Powell and Whitten (1993) and 
later amended by others (Anderson, 2000; Bengtsson, 2004; Nadeau et al., 
2002; Powell, 2000; Royed et al., 2000) as markers for clarity of responsi-
bility: the electoral system, majority status of government, opposition influ-
ence on policy making, and party system concentration. We discuss each of 
these below.
First, the electoral rules of the game often serve to diffuse government 
responsibility and obscure clarity in a political system (Powell, 2000, pp. 26-27). 
Majoritarian and proportional systems envision rather different roles for elec-
tions in connecting the preferences of citizens to government policy. Within a 
majoritarian vision elections allow citizens to directly choose between alterna-
tive governments, whereas a proportional view “sees elections as choosing rep-
resentatives who can bargain for their voters’ interests in post-election policy 
making” (Powell, 2000, p. 26). Although both systems link votes to policy, 
this connection is much clearer within majoritarian systems compared to pro-
portional systems. Consequently, pure majoritarian systems allow for high 
levels of clarity, whereas proportional systems exhibit low clarity. Mixed sys-
tems that combine elements of both ideal types fall within these extremes and 
can be characterized by middling levels of clarity.
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A second feature central to determining clarity of responsibility is the 
majority status of government (Powell, 2000, p. 52). Clarity of responsibil-
ity is at its maximum when a single-party government is responsible for 
policy making, that is, when leaders of one party hold the chief offices of the 
executive and command enough seats in the legislature to initiate and make 
changes to policies at their discretion. True minority governments in which 
a party holds the prime ministership but lacks the seats to control the legis-
lature occupy the other extreme of the spectrum. Here, the government 
party(ies) is completely dependent on other parties for its survival in office 
and for successful passage of its policies. Responsibility is blurred because 
“the party or parties . . . can always claim that their best efforts were blocked 
by other parties and that responsibility for policy failures must be shared by 
them” (Powell & Whitten, 1993, p. 401). At the same time, the parties out-
side of the executive are not readily identifiable as policy makers, making it 
difficult for voters to hold them accountable (Powell, 2000, p. 52). The myr-
iad of coalition types falling between these extremes exhibit intermediate 
degrees of clarity.
Third, the extent to which opposition parties are able to influence policy 
making can further obscure clarity of responsibility. Strong committee sys-
tems that provide opposition parties with “both real and symbolic bases of 
power” (Powell & Whitten, 1993, p. 400) in the legislature may be benefi-
cial from the standpoint of representation of interests, but they cloud respon-
sibility by facilitating (and sometimes even requiring) the dispersal of policy 
making influence to numerous groups, including opposition parties (Powell, 
2000, p. 32). In such systems, Powell (2000) notes, “even the most attentive 
observers may be hard put to say which party should bear the major respon-
sibility for the final shape of a particular piece of legislation” (p. 63).
The degree to which a party system is concentrated (or fragmented) pro-
vides a final indicator of clarity of responsibility. Two logics apply in this case. 
According to Anderson’s (2000, p. 155) “available alternatives” argument, the 
ability of voters to hold a government accountable by throwing it out of office 
hinges on citizens being able to identify a credible alternative to the incumbent 
government. A large number of effective parties vying for power increases 
uncertainty about the likely form of any future alternative government. In such 
settings, there is a greater possibility that members of the existing government 
coalition may stay on as participants in the new coalition, hindering voters’ 
efforts to sanction the responsible parties (Anderson, 2000, pp. 155-156; also 
see Lewis-Beck, 1986, pp. 340-341, 1988). Kernell (1997) offers a slightly 
different argument, suggesting that a large number of opposition parties leads 
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to a coordination problem for the voter; in essence, there are too many options 
from which to choose (also see Nadeau et al., 2002, pp. 410-411).
Data and Operationalization
To examine the influence of clarity of responsibility on EU issue voting, we 
employ mass survey data from the 2004 EES. Our choice to rely on the EES 
instead of national election surveys stems from the breadth (cross-nationally) 
of the EES and the nature of the questions included. Unlike many national 
election surveys, the EES contains questions probing voters’ evaluations of 
European integration policies.1 This information is paramount, as it allows us 
to determine the extent to which voters’ preferences for EU policy making 
influence their vote choice, that is, the extent of EU issue voting. Moreover, 
since the EES administers comparable surveys in member states across the 
EU, we are able to analyze how political–institutional arrangements influ-
ence EU issue voting in 19 Western and Eastern European countries.2
The dependent variable in our analysis, incumbent vote, is an individual’s 
vote for an incumbent government party during the last national election. It is 
constructed using the following EES question: “Which party did you vote for 
during the last general election of [year]?” Based on respondents’ party vote 
choice, we create a dummy variable, with 1 denoting a vote for a party in 
government and 0 denoting a vote for any other party. Since this question is 
based on respondents recalling their previous vote choice, we cross-validated 
the results presented in the next section using a dummy variable for incum-
bent vote based on the EES vote intention question: “If there were a general 
election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?” Again we use respon-
dents’ party vote choice to create a dummy variable, with 1 denoting a vote 
for a party in government and 0 denoting all others. Both conceptualizations 
of incumbent vote yield similar results.
We are interested in whether individuals who support their government’s 
EU policy making are more likely to give their support to an incumbent party 
and, more importantly, whether this relationship is influenced by the clar-
ity of governmental responsibility. We capture the extent of EU issue voting 
by creating an index of two EES questions. The first question asks respondents 
how much confidence they have that EU decision making is in the interest of 
their country, whereas the second inquires whether respondents feel EU 
decision making is in the interest of people like themselves. In both cases 
four answer categories were provided: 1 (a great deal of confidence), 2 (a fair 
amount), 3 (not very much), and 4 (no confidence at all). From these two items 
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 26, 2012cps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
348  Comparative Political Studies 44(3)
we constructed an index, benefit EU policy. We recoded the index so that 
1 signifies no confidence at all and 4 a great deal of confidence.3 We expect 
that as respondents have greater confidence that EU policy making is in the 
own interest or in the interest of their country, their likelihood of voting for 
an incumbent government party should increase. Thus, if EU issue voting is 
present, the value of the benefit EU policy variable should be positive and 
significant.
Clarity of responsibility is measured by constructing an index incorporat-
ing the four indicators discussed in the previous section—electoral system, 
majority status of government, opposition influence, and party system con-
centration. These measures closely mirror those employed in previous voting 
behavior studies. First, our operationalization of electoral system stems from 
Powell’s (2000, p. 41) three-category scheme, whereby systems are classi-
fied as predominately proportional, mixed, or predominately majoritarian. We 
assign these groups numerical scores reflecting the varying degree of clarity 
associated with each: predominately proportional = 0, mixed = 1, and 
predominately majoritarian = 2. Our second indicator—majority status 
of government—follows Tavits’s (2007) application of Powell (2000, 
pp. 56-57). The coding reflects ascending degrees of clarity, with minority 
governments receiving a score of 30, coalition governments a score of 60, and 
majority governments a score of 100. Third, we operationalize opposition 
influence on policy making by considering the strength and inclusiveness of 
the formal committee structure in a given country. The number of permanent 
committees, proportional sharing of committee chairs between the govern-
ment and opposition, and committee specialization corresponding to govern-
ment departments provide powerful indicators of the potential influence of 
committees relative to the government as well as the influence of the opposi-
tion in the committee system. Taken together, these indicators capture the 
extent of opposition influence and thus reflect the diffusion of responsibility 
in a political system (Powell, 2000, pp. 31-36, 63-64; also see Strøm, 1990, 
p. 71). Combining them, we construct a trichotomous variable to operational-
ize opposition influence, where 0 = high influence, 1 = some influence, and 
2 = low influence (Powell, 2000, p. 59). Finally, we take up Anderson’s (2000) 
argument concerning clarity of alternatives by including an indicator of party 
system concentration (also see Kernell, 1997). Here, we rely on Golder’s 
(2005) coding of effective number of parliamentary parties.4
We obtain a single country-level measure of clarity of responsibility by 
aggregating the above variables into a four-component index. We do so by 
first standardizing the indicators and then creating an index.5 The outcome 
is a variable ranging from –1.08 (low clarity) to 1.33 (high clarity). The 
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 26, 2012cps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
de Vries et al. 349
breakdown of countries that we attain is roughly the same as those found in 
other studies on clarity of responsibility (e.g., Nadeau et al., 2002, p. 412; 
Powell & Whitten, 1993, p. 406). In general, three groups emerge: low 
clarity = Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia; middle 
clarity = Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the 
Netherlands, and Slovenia; high clarity = Great Britain, Greece, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, and Spain. Since we are primarily interested in the role that clarity 
of responsibility plays in moderating EU issue voting, we use this index to 
create an interaction term—benefit EU policy × clarity of responsibility.
To determine if EU issue voting occurs independently of other sources 
of voting behavior, we control for non-EU-related policy and performance 
factors as well as for the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents. 
The policy and performance variables include left–right proximity, govern-
ment approval, and prospective and retrospective national economic evalu-
ations. The socioeconomic controls include education, age, and social class. 
These latter variables are incorporated to control for dominant models explain-
ing vote choice, such as economic and cleavage-based voting. In addition, the 
inclusion of these controls ensures that a respondent’s attitude toward EU 
policy making is not merely a proxy for other factors. Much of the research 
on EU support points to socioeconomic attributes to explain support or 
opposition to EU institutions, policy making, and the process of European 
integration. The argument is that economic integration in Europe has cre-
ated differential benefits for EU citizens (Gabel, 1998) depending on their 
income and education levels as well as on the basis of their social class 
status.
Analysis and Results
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two parts. We first estimate a model of 
voting behavior using the complete index of clarity of responsibility. We then 
disaggregate the measure to examine the independent effects of its constituent 
parts—electoral system, majority status of the government, opposition influ-
ence, and concentration of the party system. The dependent variable through-
out the study is dichotomous, with 1 indicating a vote for an incumbent 
government party and 0 indicating a vote for an opposition party. We cannot 
simply pool these national surveys given the fact that individual vote choices 
are also nested within a national context. Neglecting the hierarchical struc-
ture of the data would lead to an underestimation of standard errors and 
enhance the likelihood of spurious inferences. We estimate a multilevel 
(or hierarchical) model (MLM) that allows us to correct for dependence of 
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observations within countries (i.e., intraclass correlation) and make adjust-
ments to both within and between parameter estimates for the clustered 
nature of the data (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). 
This model also allows us to model differences in explanations of incumbent 
vote across national contexts, that is, the variation in EU issue voting across 
institutional environments providing different lines of responsibility for gov-
ernment policy. Since our dependent variable is dichotomous in nature, we 
estimate a MLM model with a logit link function and a Bernoulli sampling 
model (see Hobolt, Spoon, & Tilley, 2009, for a similar approach).
The MLM model can be expressed as a single equation for each level. We 
begin by specifying the Level 1 (or individual-level) model. The dependent 
variable (π
ij
) denotes the vote for an incumbent government party (1) or a vote 
for the opposition (0) for each respondent (i) in each country (j). In addition to 
the 11 individual-level predictors, the model includes an individual-level con-
stant β
0
, which enables us to bring in the Level 2 (country-level) predictors.
Logit(π
ij
) = β
0j
 + β
1
X
1ij
 + . . . + β
n
X
nij
 + μ
0j
                        (1)
In addition, Equation 1 includes a term (μ
0j
) that captures the variance in the 
dependent variable over the context. The inclusion of this Level 2 random 
effect (i.e., μ
0j
) allows us to test the effect of our country-level predictors 
without imposing the difficult assumption that our model accounts for all 
possible sources of contextual heterogeneity. Since the individual-level resid-
ual variance follows directly from the success probability of incumbent vote, 
this model specification does not include a separate parameter for the Level 1 
variance.
We are interested not only in the individual-level explanations of incum-
bent vote but in particular in the way in which political institutions, that is in 
the lines of political responsibility they provide, moderate voters’ choices. 
Specifically, our expectation is that voters are better able to reward or punish 
governments’ for their European integration policy in higher clarity systems in 
which a single, unified party has primary control over policy making, whereas 
low-clarity settings leave voters less able to hold their governments account-
able. Consequently, we include the clarity of responsibility index incorporat-
ing the four indicators discussed in the previous section—electoral system, 
majority status of government, opposition influence, and party system con-
centration (in a subsequent analysis—see Table 2—we include each of the 
clarity of responsibility components separately). Given the limited number 
of countries included in the analysis, we have to condense the inclusion of 
country-level controls. To account for the fact that the six Eastern European 
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countries in our sample have less developed political systems because of the 
transition from communist rule in the early 1990s, we include a dummy vari-
able for newly established democracy.
For each Level 2 case, in the analysis a country, we estimate a unique 
Level 1 model. This produces intercept and slope estimates specific to each 
country. At the second level, each of the Level 1 coefficients (and their inter-
cepts) is a potential dependent variable (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 1992). 
Equation 2 thus expands our model of vote choice for an incumbent govern-
ment party (π
ij
) to also include both individual-level factors, that is, X and 
their estimates β, respectively, as well as two factors signifying the context in 
which a respondent (i) resides, namely W and their estimates α:
Logit(π
ij
) = β
0
 + β
1
X
1ij
 + . . . + β
n
X
nij
 + α
1
W
1j
 + . . . α
n
W
nj
 + μ
0j
 .      (2)
The third equation signifying the final model also includes the cross-level 
interaction between voters’ evaluation of EU policy making and the degree of 
clarity of responsibility, that is, benefit EU policy × clarity of responsibility. 
It assumes that the strength of voters’ evaluation of EU policy making on 
incumbent vote differs according to the degree of clarity of responsibility. 
The variance in the slope of benefit EU policy is thus partially accounted for 
by the contextual-level factor, that is, clarity of responsibility. Technically, 
this cross-level interaction is captured by adding the term W
kj
X
kij
 and its esti-
mate γ
1
 as well as the random part μ
1j
X
kij
. Incumbent vote (π
ij
) is modeled as 
a function of individual-level, country-level explanatory variables, a cross-
level interaction, and a country-level disturbance term.
 Logit(π
ij
) = β
0
 + β
1
X
1ij
 + . . . + β
n
X
nij
 + α
1
W
1j
 + . . . α
n
W
nj
 +   (3)
  γ
1
W
kj
X
kij
 + μ
0j
 + μ
1j
X
kij
  .
Table 1 provides the results of the MLM logistical regression analysis 
incorporating the clarity of responsibility index.6 Turning to the individual 
predictors included in the full clarity of responsibility model, we find cor-
roboration of our theoretical predictions. It is important to recall that the coef-
ficients in the model show the change in the log odds of voting for the 
government party(ies) versus the opposition as a result of a one-unit increase 
in the independent variable. In other words, a positive coefficient indicates an 
increased likelihood of voting for an incumbent party rather than an opposi-
tion party (Agresti, 2002; Long & Freese, 2006).
By itself, the effect of voters’ evaluation of EU policy making on incum-
bent vote is significant and in the expected positive direction. These findings 
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Table 1. Exploring the Interaction Between EU Issue Voting and Clarity of 
Responsibility
Baseline model
Clarity of 
responsibility model
Predictor Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Individual level  
 Benefit EU policy 0.15*** (0.04) 0.13*** (0.04)
 Left–right proximity 0.62*** (0.04) 0.62*** (0.04)
 Government policy approval 1.32*** (0.05) 1.33*** (0.05)
 Prospective economic evaluations 0.21*** (0.03) 0.21*** (0.03)
 Retrospective economic  
 evaluations
0.10*** (0.03) 0.11*** (0.03)
 Gender 0.04 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05)
 Education -0.01* (0.01) -0.01* (0.01)
 Income 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
 Social class 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
 Religiosity 0.05** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02)
 Residency -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03)
Country level  
 Clarity of responsibility — -0.56* (0.34)
 Benefit of EU policy × clarity 
 of responsibility
— 0.11*** (0.05)
 Newly established democracy — 0.11 (0.43)
 Intercept -2.50*** (0.26) -2.39*** (0.24)
Random effects  
 Contextual variance component 0.86*** (0.27) 0.58*** (0.19)
 No. of groups 19 19 
 No. of individuals 11,688 11,688 
Source: European Election Study 2004. Table entries are multilevel model logistic coefficients 
with standard errors in parentheses.
*p ≤ .01, two-tailed. **p ≤ .05, two-tailed. ***p ≤ .01, two-tailed.
fit our expectations regarding EU issue voting, demonstrating that the likeli-
hood of an individual voting for the government increases as she or he has 
greater confidence that the EU policy making pursued by her or his govern-
ment is more in line with her or his own interests or those of her or his coun-
try. More importantly, when voters’ evaluation of EU policy making is 
estimated in interaction with the clarity of responsibility index, we find that 
clearer responsibility enhances the effects of EU issue voting considerably as 
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Table 2. Exploring the Interaction Between EU Issue Voting and Different 
Components of Clarity of Responsibility
Components of clarity of responsibility
 Majority status
Electoral 
system
Committee 
influence
System 
concentration
Predictor Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Individual level  
 Benefit EU 
policy
0.15*** (0.04) 0.15*** (0.04) 0.15*** (0.04) 0.15*** (0.04)
 Left–right 
proximity
0.64*** (0.04) 0.65*** (0.04) 0.63*** (0.04) 0.62*** (0.04)
 Government 
approval
1.34*** (0.05) 1.33*** (0.05) 1.34*** (0.05) 1.34*** (0.05)
 Prospective 
economic 
evaluations
0.21*** (0.03) 0.22*** (0.03) 0.21*** (0.03) 0.21*** (0.03)
 Retrospective 
economic 
evaluation
0.10*** (0.03) 0.10*** (0.03) 0.11*** (0.03) 0.11*** (0.03)
 Gender 0.04 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05)
 Education -0.01* (0.01) -0.01* (0.01) -0.01* (0.01) -0.01* (0.01)
 Income 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
 Social class 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
 Religiosity 0.05** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02)
 Residency -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03)
Country level  
 Clarity of 
responsibility
-0.09 (0.30) -0.10 (0.20) -0.25 (0.20) -0.23 (0.28)
 Benefit EU 
policy × 
clarity of 
responsibility
0.07* (0.04) 0.16*** (0.03) 0.06* (0.03) 0.01 (0.04)
 Newly 
established 
democracy
0.33 (0.50) 0.34 (0.40) 0.29 (0.39) 0.34 (0.45)
 Intercept -2.31*** (0.25) -2.37*** (0.23) -2.34*** (0.23) -2.25*** (0.25)
Random effects  
 Variance 
component
0.82*** (0.26) 0.62*** (0.20) 0.62*** (0.20) 0.72*** (0.23)
 No. of groups 19 19 19 19 
 No. of 
individuals
11,688 11,688 11,688 11,688 
Source: European Election Study 2004. Table entries are multilevel model logistic coefficients with standard 
errors in parentheses.
*p ≤ .01, two-tailed. **p ≤ .05, two-tailed. ***p ≤ .01, two-tailed.
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the coefficient is positive and significant. This effect is consistent with this 
article’s hypothesis that clarity of responsibility facilitates voting on the 
EU issue.
We utilize a benefit EU policy index to operationalize the extent of EU 
issue voting. This index combines two items tapping into the degree of benefit 
of EU policy for “one’s country” and for “people like yourselves.” To ensure 
that the results are not dependent on the way in which the question is framed, 
we conducted analyses for the two items separately. These results show that 
the analyses based on the two components of benefit of EU policy are largely 
identical, that is, in both instances we find that clearer lines of responsibility 
boost the effects of EU issue voting. Consequently, we can be quite certain 
that the framing of the question in terms of national or personal benefit of EU 
policy making does not affect the overall result reported in Table 1.7
Finally, the coefficients for the control variables conform to expectations 
based on previous research, suggesting that our findings regarding the EU 
issue are independent of traditional influences on the vote. The results dem-
onstrate a strong influence of both left–right proximity and government 
approval on citizens’ voting behavior. These results should not come as a 
surprise. Previous research suggests that the left–right dimension is the main 
predictor of vote choice. In addition, an individual will be more inclined to 
vote for the incumbent when she or he feels the government has performed 
well. It is also worth noting that we find support for the economic voting 
hypothesis. The likelihood of a citizen voting for the incumbent government 
increases as her or his evaluation (either retrospective or prospective) of the 
economy improves.
Because of the fact that our sample includes only 19 second-level units, the 
maximum likelihood estimation used in Table 1 may not perform optimally 
(see Gellman & Hill, 2007). Consequently, we also conducted an analysis 
using a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method (see Gellman 
& Hill, 2007; Jackman, 2000) to inspect the robustness of our findings. The 
results of this robustness check show that the Bayesian setup yields substan-
tially similar results to those reported in Table 1.8
The interpretation of logistic regression coefficients and interaction terms 
is not straightforward given that they convey changes in log odds and condi-
tional effects. To express the results in a more intuitive fashion, we conduct 
postestimation simulations to gain a sense of the marginal effect of the inter-
action between EU issue proximity and clarity of responsibility on the pre-
dicted probability of incumbent vote (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006). By 
manipulating the values of both voters’ evaluations of EU policy making and 
clarity of responsibility (while keeping the others constant at their respective 
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means), we are able to observe changes in the predicted probabilities of 
choosing the incumbent government over the opposition. We are primarily 
interested in the moderating influence of clarity of responsibility on EU issue 
voting. Are individuals in higher clarity environments more likely to take 
their EU policy making evaluations into account when casting their votes 
than those in lower clarity settings? Figure 1 sheds light on this question.
The figure illustrates the impact of voters’ evaluations of the benefit of EU 
policy making on the likelihood that an individual will vote for a government 
party, taking into account different institutional contexts. The x-axis denotes 
the voters’ evaluations of the benefit of EU policy making for themselves or 
their country, whereas the y-axis shows the probability of voting for a gov-
ernment party at each value of benefit EU policy. The three lines show these 
marginal effects for high, middle, and low levels of clarity of responsi-
bility. Recall that we obtained a single country-level measure of clarity of 
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Figure 1. Predicted changes in probability of incumbent vote as EU issue proximity 
and clarity of responsibility change
Note:  Values indicate the predicted change in the probability of choosing a government versus 
an opposition party as a voter’s evaluation of the benefit EU policy for her or his country and 
herself or himself changes. Low clarity = Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia; middle 
clarity = Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 
Slovenia; high clarity = Great Britain, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain.
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responsibility by aggregating the above variables into a four-component index 
to produce three groups: low clarity (Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Poland, 
and Slovakia), middle clarity (Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Slovenia), and high clarity (Great 
Britain, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain). To illuminate the condi-
tional effect of clarity of responsibility on the impact of EU policy-making 
evaluations on incumbent vote, we provide marginal effects for low-, middle-, 
and high-clarity countries separately. The predicted change in vote probabil-
ity as benefit EU policy is moved from a minimum to maximum value under 
high-clarity conditions is 18 percentage points compared to only 5.4 percent-
age points when clarity is low. This conforms to our expectations. Political 
systems that concentrate power enhance the relationship between incumbent 
vote and EU policy making evaluations, generating higher levels of reward 
or punishment of governments on the basis of the European integration 
policies they pursue in high-clarity systems as compared to their low-clarity 
counterparts.
Robustness Check: Individual  
Components of Clarity of Responsibility
What about the individual components of clarity of responsibility? Are the 
findings above driven by a specific variable included in the clarity index, or 
does each of the components have a direct impact on the strength of the EU 
issue voting relationship? We can further explore the influence of clarity of 
responsibility on EU issue voting by breaking down the index into its com-
ponent parts and examining the individual effect of each on EU issue voting. 
To do so, we run separate models for the four indicators—electoral system, 
concentration, majority status of government, and committee influence.9 The 
results are reported in Table 2.
The findings of the analyses attest to the robustness of our argument for 
all of the individual clarity of responsibility components except for system 
concentration measured by the effective number of parliamentary parties. In 
the case of system concentration, the sign of the interaction effect coeffi-
cient is in the expected positive direction but does not reach statistical sig-
nificance. For the other components, the coefficients and the key interaction 
terms are statistically significant, demonstrating that higher levels of clarity 
of responsibility make it more likely that an individual will choose to vote 
for the government on the basis of her or his evaluations of EU policy making. 
This suggests that majoritarian electoral systems, majority governments, and 
weak opposition influence are all individually associated with higher levels 
of EU issue voting.
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Overall, these results demonstrate that political institutions influence the 
level of EU issue voting via clarity of responsibility. Institutional environments 
that concentrate executive power, creating clear lines of responsibility, allow 
voters to sanction governments for the state of their policy making regard-
ing European integration. This finding adds to the growing body of scientific 
work on EU issue voting by highlighting a factor that helps to explain cross-
national variations in the extent of EU issue voting. Our results suggest that 
EU issue voting is most prominent in member states whose political systems 
concentrate executive power in the hands of a single national party. This pos-
sibility had been neglected in previous research on EU issue voting.
Conclusion
This study examines whether EU issue voting is conditioned by political 
institutions. Drawing on strong evidence from the economic voting literature, 
this study argues that the extent to which a domestic institutional environment 
presents clear lines of accountability for government policy making affects 
the degree to which evaluations of one’s government’s EU policy making 
inform ballot choices. In other words, the link between European integration 
policies and incumbent vote is stronger when responsibility of government 
performance is clear. The empirical analysis presented in this study provides 
compelling evidence for the extension of the clarity of responsibility argu-
ment beyond the context of economic voting. Using 2004 EES data from 
19 Eastern and Western European countries, we demonstrate the impact of 
the formal institutional setting on levels of EU issue voting. In particular, we 
show that in institutional settings that focus executive power, that is, in those 
where the lines of responsibility are clear, voters are better able to deter-
mine which actors to reward or punish for their European integration policies.
This study makes two important contributions. First, its findings are impor-
tant for students of voting behavior. The clarity of responsibility hypothesis 
was developed in the early 1990s by scholars to explain cross-national varia-
tions in the strength of economic voting. To date, however, no other study has 
exported or tested the clarity of responsibility hypothesis in other fields of pol-
icy voting (the other two studies that apply this concept to another field—Giger, 
in press, and Tavits, 2007—examine the effect of clarity on corruption and the 
electoral costs of social policy, respectively). Consequently, the evidence pre-
sented here is significant in that it demonstrates the applicability of the clarity 
of responsibility argument beyond the ambit of economic policies.
Second, this research contributes to the field of EU studies in that it adds 
to our understanding of the conditions under which EU issue voting takes 
place. Interestingly, by demonstrating that EU issue voting is moderated by 
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political institutions in largely the same way as economic voting, this study 
suggests that the EU issue behaves more or less like any other policy issue in 
electoral competition. More importantly, the results add to our understanding 
of cross-national variation in levels of EU issue voting. Previous research has 
highlighted the role of strategic party behavior (de Vries, 2007) and referenda 
on EU questions (de Vries, 2009; Tillman, 2004) in generating a European 
issue in national elections. Our results suggest that the extent to which this 
EU issue becomes important in national elections is moderated by that coun-
try’s political system.
We conclude by outlining several future avenues of research that this study 
has not considered. First, in a next step we intend to compare these results to 
issue voting in other areas, such as immigration or the environment. Is issue 
voting on these increasingly salient matters also conditioned by institutional 
characteristics? If a generalizable pattern emerges about the effects of clarity 
of responsibility on performance and issue voting, this would have important 
ramifications for our understanding about institutional design and policy rep-
resentation (Powell, 2000). Second, this study has focused solely on horizon-
tal clarity of responsibility at the national level. An additional line of research 
concerns an important and often omitted component of political context and 
clarity of responsibility: the vertical dimension of multilevel governance (see 
Anderson, 2006). Indeed, the development of the EU institutions itself may 
have obscured responsibility for government policy at the national level. Policy 
making in contemporary Europe takes place in a tangled web of institutional 
responsibilities, meaning that governments throughout the EU no longer hold 
a sole monopoly over policy making. As a result, it will be important to exam-
ine the extent to which these developments have resulted in the blurring of 
government responsibilities in the eyes of voters by a comparison of EU and 
non-EU member states.
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Notes
1. Some readers may question whether our results hold given that the focus and tim-
ing of the European Election Study (EES) surveys may lead to overstated European 
Union (EU) issue voting. A number of previous studies using national election 
study data have found evidence of EU issue voting, so we would contend that this 
basic finding is not in doubt. Moreover, our focus is on differences in the strength 
of EU issue voting across member states. Since any presumed cueing effect in 
the EES surveys should be constant across national contexts, this should not be a 
threat to inference for our study.
2. The following countries are included in the analysis: Austria, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Spain.
3. This is a slightly different measure than previous studies of EU issue voting 
have used (e.g., de Vries, 2007; Schoen, 2008; Tillman, 2004). Prior studies 
have generally measured the distance between each respondent and party on a 
10-point scale of support or opposition to European integration. We chose this 
measure because it captures voters’ evaluations of their governments’ perfor-
mance concerning EU policy making. In doing so, we can determine the extent 
to which institutional clarity affects the way in which voters relate to the EU 
policy performance of their government to electoral support for incumbent. In 
this sense, it is not identical to the concept of EU issue voting developed by 
Tillman (2004) and de Vries (2007), but it focuses on the same underlying pref-
erences regarding continued European integration. We also note that we ran the 
analyses using the issue proximity measure used in other studies (e.g., de Vries, 
2007; Tillman, 2004), and we obtained the same substantive results presented 
here, adding strength to our contention that this measure relates to those used in 
other studies of EU issue voting.
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4. Note that these four components largely coincide with the operationalization of 
clarity of responsibility found in the seminal work of Powell and Whitten (1993; 
also see Powell, 2000). Powell and Whitten outline five components of clarity of 
responsibility (pp. 397-402): opposition committee chair, weak party cohesion, 
politically significant bicameral opposition, minority government, and number 
of government parties. The index employed here already covers opposition com-
mittee influence, the number of parties, and the minority status of a government. 
To inspect the robustness of our findings further, we also conducted the analysis 
using an indicator of bicameral opposition based on Powell (2000) as an additional 
component of clarity of responsibility. The results of this analysis provide largely 
identical results to those presented here. We unfortunately lack current data on 
party cohesion and could not perform a robustness using this component.
5. The correlations (significant at the p < .001 level, two-tailed) between the four 
different components of clarity of responsibility are .53 between committee influ-
ence (CI) and electoral system (ES), .18 between CI and majority status (MS), .14 
between CI and system concentration (SC), .53 between ES and MS, .37 between 
ES and SC, and .51 between MS and SC.
6. All models were estimated in MlWin 2.12.
7. These results are available from the authors on request.
8. These results are available from the authors on request.
9. Since the indicators are intended to capture the same underlying concept of clar-
ity, they are highly correlated. Including all of them in a single analysis would 
therefore not be particularly fruitful since the independent effects would likely be 
underestimated given the high degree of multicollinearity.
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